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Government Employees' Freedom of Expression is
Limited: The Expression Must Touch on Matters of
"Public Concern" or be Intended to Educate
or Inform the Public about the Employer to
Warrant First Amendment Protection:
City of San Diego v. Roe
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION - PUBLIC EMPLOYEES - When a government em-
ployee's speech is unrelated to his employment and does not touch
on a matter of public concern, the expression is not analyzed un-
der the Pickering balancing test.
City of San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521 (2004).
John Roe (hereinafter "Roe") was a police officer for the City of
San Diego Police Department (hereinafter "SDPD") in San Diego,
California.1 Roe created a personal profile on eBay, where he
identified himself as a member of law enforcement and offered for
sale police equipment, including official SDPD uniforms, men's
underwear, and custom-made sexually-explicit videos in which he
starred.2 Roe appeared in some of his videos wearing a police uni-
form while engaging in acts of masturbation.3 His supervisor dis-
covered his profile and commenced an investigation into Roe's
eBay activities, which revealed he was violating a number of de-
partmental policies.4 When confronted by the SDPD, Roe admit-
ted to his activities and was ordered to stop engaging in any activ-
ity that would make the sexually explicit materials available to
the public via any media channel.5 He complied in part but failed
1. City of San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 522 (2004).
2. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 522.
3. Id. The uniform Roe wore in the videos was not the official uniform of the SDPD,
but it was obvious to any viewer that it was a police uniform. Id.
4. Id. at 523. The violations included "conduct unbecoming of an officer, outside em-
ployment, and immoral conduct." Id.
5. Id. The SDPD ordered Roe to "cease displaying, manufacturing, distributing or
selling any sexually explicit materials or engaging in any similar behaviors, via the inter-
net, U.S. Mail, commercial vendors or distributors, or any other medium available to the
public." Id. (citing Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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to remove his profile, which included the offer to sell custom vid-
eos.' When the SDPD learned of the continued existence of Roe's
profile on eBay, it cited Roe for disobedience of lawful orders, ini-
tiated termination proceedings, and eventually dismissed him
from the police force.7
Roe filed a § 1983 claim in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of California, alleging that his termination
violated his right to engage in free speech under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution.8 The district court
granted the City of San Diego's motion for summary judgment,
stating that Roe's activities did not warrant First Amendment
protection because the subject or content was not related to a mat-
ter of public concern under Connick v. Meyers.9 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, because Roe's conduct
was not related to his employment as a police officer, his speech
qualified as the type of expression pertaining to matters of public
concern in which a citizen is free to engage."0 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether Roe's speech was entitled
to the protection described in United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union" (hereinafter "NTEU"), because it occurred out-
side the workplace and pertained to subjects unrelated to his em-
ployment, and whether Roe's speech touched on a matter of public
6. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 523. "[R]oe removed some of the items he had offered for sale,
[but] did not change his seller's profile, which described the first two videos he had pro-
duced and listed their prices as well as the prices for custom videos." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 523 (citing Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)). In Connick,
the Supreme Court attempted to define what type of speech touches on a matter of public
concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. The Court stated that the content, form, and context
must be examined and indicated that "employee expression [that] cannot be fairly consid-
ered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community" was
essentially a matter of personal interest. Id. at 146. Further, the Court provided certain
examples of types of speech about a government employer that would qualify as speech on a
matter of public concern. Id. at 148. Had the employee been attempting to inform or edu-
cate the public about the agency's failure to adequately perform its duties, or the agency's
actual wrongdoings, that speech would have warranted First Amendment protection. Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 523. "Central to the Court of Appeals' conclusion was that Roe's
expression was not an internal workplace grievance, took place while he was off-duty and
away from his employer's premises, and was unrelated to his employment." Id. (citing Roe,
356 F.3d at 1110, 1113-14).
11. 513 U.S. 454 (1995). In NTEU, the Supreme Court determined that it is unconsti-
tutional for government employers to restrict the speech of government employees that
occurs while the employee is off duty and pertains to subjects unrelated to their employ-
ment when there is no evidence that actual injury to the employer will result if the em-
ployee is permitted to engage in the expressive activity. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 457.
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concern and was therefore entitled to the balancing test set forth
in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dis-
trict, Will County, Illinois" (hereinafter "Pickering").
The Supreme Court began its analysis by explaining how the
First Amendment right to free speech has been held to apply to a
governmental employee, clarifying that while such an employee
does not forfeit his right to engage in free speech, his speech can
be constitutionally restrained in ways that a non-governmental
employee citizen's speech could not. 3 The Court relied on the tests
enunciated in Pickering and NTEU in its determination that Roe's
speech was not protected.14
The Court examined the court of appeals' decision that Roe's
speech was a matter of public concern in accordance with the
NTEU line of cases." In NTEU, the speech in question did not
relate to the speaker's employment or impact the speaker's em-
ployer. 6 Rather, the NTEU claimants were rank-and-file govern-
ment employees who wrote dance performance reviews, gave lec-
tures on black history, and engaged in other similar activities
while off duty.'7 Unlike the employees' activities in NTEU, the
Court in the instant case found that Roe's expressive activities
were directly linked to his employment because he identified him-
self as a member of law enforcement and wore his uniform, as
such, the Court found that Roe's activities placed the SDPD in a
negative light because of the sexually explicit nature of the activi-
ties." The Court agreed with the SDPD's allegations that the
message Roe's activities communicated conflicted with the de-
12. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). For the first time, the Supreme Court created a test to be
employed to determine whether a government employer can, consistent with the Constitu-
tion, terminate or otherwise discipline an employee for engaging in expressive activity.
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The Supreme Court stated that a balance must be reached
between the interests of the public employee, "as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568.
13. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 523.
14. Id. at 523-24.
15. Id. at 524. See NTEU, 513 U.S. 454.
16. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 524 (citing NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465). The Roe Court discussed
how, in NTEU, the Supreme Court had examined "whether the Federal Government could
impose monetary restrictions on outside earnings from speaking or writing on a class of
federal employees." Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 524. It determined that the speech had no adverse
impact on the employer and therefore, the First Amendment rights of the employee could
not be restricted. Id.
17. NTEU, 5"13 U.S. at 469-70.
18. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 524. The Court concluded that Roe took "deliberate steps to link
his videos and other wares to his police work, all in a way injurious to his employer." Id.
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partment's policies and had a detrimental effect on the force's abil-
ity to function properly. 9 The Court therefore found that the court
of appeals' reliance on NTEU as controlling authority was mis-
placed and that the proper authority was instead contained within
Pickering and Connick. °
The Supreme Court then explained that the Pickering test for
determining whether a governmental employee may engage freely
in speech balances the employee's interest in free expression and
the employer's interest in promoting its mission.2 The Court reit-
erated the Pickering Court's acknowledgement that citizens in
public employ possess more information than the general public
about their governmental employers' operations and that they are
therefore able to share relevant information with the public on
matters that the public deems of import or interest.22 The Court
stated that because of the government employee's unique accessi-
bility to information on matters of public concern, the protection
afforded to his right to engage in free speech benefits him as well
21as the public, who seeks the information he possesses. As such,
the Court determined that, in order for a government employee's
speech to require Pickering balancing, the information he dis-
seminates must be related to a matter of public concern, as de-
fined in Connick.24 The Roe Court looked to Connick for guidance
on what type of speech touches on matters of "public concern,"
rather than speech of a purely personal nature, and found that it
is necessary to evaluate the entirety of what is being said, in what
context, and in what manner.25
Having examined Roe's speech as a whole, the Court announced
in a per curiam opinion that Roe's expression did not meet the
definition of speech concerning a matter of public importance and
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 525 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). The Pickering balancing test applies
when a court is evaluating restraints on a public employee's right to free speech. Roe, 125
S. Ct. at 525. The court must balance "the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in com-
menting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. (cit-
ing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
22. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 525 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572).
23. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 525.
24. Id. "Pickering did not hold that any and all statements by a public employee are
entitled to balancing. To require Pickering balancing in every case where speech by a pub-
lic employee is at issue, no matter what the content of the speech, could compromise the
proper functioning of government offices." Id. (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 143).
25. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 525.
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therefore did not warrant Pickering balancing.26 The Court found
that Roe's speech was not intended to inform the public about any
aspect of the SDPD; instead, his use of his connection to the de-
partment exploited the image of an SDPD police officer in a way
that reflected poorly on his employer.27 As a result, the Court held
that Roe's speech was not entitled to any of the protections that
might be afforded to speech on matters of public concern made by
employees of governmental entities.8
Had the Court decided that Roe's speech did touch on a matter
of public concern, it would have been required to weigh his inter-
est as a private citizen, commenting on a matter of concern to the
public at large, against the SDPD's interest in promoting effi-
ciency in conducting a pubic service.29 In 1882 the Supreme Court
announced in Ex parte Curtis that, when considering such inter-
ests, it would afford great weight to the government's need to
promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of its duties.0
The issue in Ex Parte Curtis and for several decades to follow sur-
rounded the government's authority to restrict the political con-
duct of public employees.31 Curtis, an employee of the United
States, challenged the constitutionality of legislation prohibiting
governmental employees from soliciting, giving to, or receiving
from other governmental employees money or other property of
value for political purposes." Chief Justice Waite, writing for the
majority, referenced various other pieces of legislation creating
similar prohibitions and summarized that the collective purpose of
all such former legislation was to "promote efficiency and integrity
in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper disci-
pline in the public service." "3 The Court opined that such purposes
were within the scope of the legislature; it possesses the power to
enact legislation necessary and proper for carrying out the powers
delegated to Congress in the Constitution.34 The majority rea-
soned that placing a limitation on political contributions protected
26. Id. at 526.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
30. 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882).
31. Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. at 371-72.
32. Id. at 371. Curtis was indicted and fined for receiving money for political purposes
and "held committed until payment was made." Id. He was taken into custody and filed a
writ of habeas corpus. Id.
33. Id. at 373.
34. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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government employees from being coerced into engaging in politi-
cal activity as a means to secure or advance their employment po-
sitions.35
Justice Bradley, dissenting in Ex parte Curtis, argued that the
act was in fact a restriction on the fundamental rights to readily
associate and engage in free expression, resulting in "unjust re-
straint of his right to propagate and promote his views on public
affairs."" While he agreed that the purpose behind the legislation
was valid, the means to achieving that goal was not a "legitimate
or constitutional one, because it interfere[d] too much with the
freedom of the citizen in the pursuit of lawful and proper ends."7
In United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell' the Supreme
Court denied a challenge to the constitutionality of The Hatch Act,
which prohibited certain government officers from taking part in
political management or political campaigns.39 A challenge was
brought by a roller in the Mint who had participated in political
activities during his free time.4" The employee's argument was
that what he did outside of work was not subject to regulation by
his employer.41 The Supreme Court disagreed, stating, "[T]hese
fundamental human rights are not absolutes[.] . . . [This] Court
must balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom against a
congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against
the supposed evil of political partisanship by classified employees
of the government." 2
The Court acknowledged that Congress has the power to regu-
late, within reasonable limits, the political conduct of its employ-
ees and that all prior legislation of such kind had been designed to
"promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties,
and to maintain proper discipline in the public service." 3 The
Court recognized that employees who did not impact governmen-
35. Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. at 374-75.
36. Id. at 377.
37. Id. at 378.
38. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
39. United Public Workers of Am., 330 U.S. at 78. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508. The
Hatch Act declared unlawful certain specified political activities for federal employees.
United Public Workers of Am., 330 U.S. at 78. The activities had previously been prohib-
ited only to employees in the classified civil service of the United States, but the Hatch Act
expanded the restriction, applying it to all federal officers, whether in the classified civil
service or not, making the penalty for violation dismissal from employment. Id. at 78-79.
40. United Public Workers of Am., 330 U.S. at 101.
41. Id. at 95.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 96-97 (quotingEx Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. at 373).
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tal policy faced restrictions on their political activity but opined
that "what Congress feared was the cumulative effect on employee
morale of political activity by all employees who could be induced
to participate actively," which was not an "unconstitutional basis
for legislation."'
Less than a decade later in Adler v. Board of Education of City
of New York, the Court upheld another restriction on political ac-
tivity. 5 This time, however, the challengers were teachers and the
restriction targeted affiliation with organizations advocating the
overthrow of the United States government.46 The subject of the
dispute was the Feinberg Law, which denied employment to, and
permitted dismissal of, any employee of the public school system
found to be a member of a "subversive group," particularly the
Communist party.47 Several teachers challenged the law as a vio-
lation of their freedom of speech and assembly. 8 The Court
agreed that the claimants had a right to hold and express their
individual viewpoints, but that they did not have a right to work
for the public school system on their own terms. 9 Justice Minton,
writing for the majority, explained that the choice exists for the
current and potential employees of the school system to retain
their right to free expression by simply seeking alternate employ-
ment, and the government's creation of such a restriction was not
a deprivation by the State of the teachers' right to free speech or
assembly." The Court relied on its recent decision in Garner v.
Board of Public Works,5 where it had recently opined:
We think that a municipal employer is not disabled be-
cause it is an agency of the State from inquiring of its
employees as to matters that may prove relevant to their
fitness and suitability for the public service. Past con-
duct may well relate to present fitness; past loyalty may
have a reasonable relationship to present and future
trust. Both are commonly inquired into in determining
44. United Public Workers of Am., 330 U.S. at 101.
45. 342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled in part by Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
46. Adler, 342 U.S. at 492-93.
47. Id. at 487-89.
48. Id. at 492.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 492.
51. 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951).
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fitness for both high and low positions in private industry
and are not less relevant to public employment.52
Justice Minton stated that the Constitution does not prevent a
state from taking into consideration a potential or current em-
ployee's associations or affiliations when assessing the fitness and
loyalties of its employees.53 The majority reasoned that the place-
ment of this restriction on the public employee only limited his
freedom of speech or assembly in the "remote sense that limitation
is inherent in every choice."54 Justice Black, in his dissenting
opinion, argued that the Feinberg Law is one of those "rapidly
multiplying legislative enactments which make it dangerous -
this time for school teachers - to think or say anything except
what a transient majority happen to approve at the moment."55
He went on to refer to this policy as a form of censorship on public
officials that penalizes teachers for their thoughts and affilia-
tions.56 Justice Douglas also authored a dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Black concurred, arguing against a policy that
forces public employees to sacrifice civil rights in exchange for
employment in public service.57 Justice Douglas stressed the pur-
pose of the First Amendment - encouraging free intellectual
thought and the exchange of ideas - and the pursuit of truth as
its primary aim, arguing that the Court's decision punishes
thought rather than action.58
The Feinberg Law was again challenged in the mid-1960s, this
time on the basis of the law's purported vagueness.59 In a five-four
opinion, it was struck down as vague and overbroad."0 The
Feinberg Law had been transformed somewhat since Adler, such
that instead of an employee having to sign a specific statement
swearing not to participate in certain organizations or engage in
certain activities, the employee now was simply informed that cer-
tain sections of the Education Law and the Civil Service Law con-
52. Adler, 342 U.S. at 492-93 (quoting Garner, 341 U.S. at 720).
53. Adler, 342 U.S. at 493.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 496-97.
56. Id. at 497.
57. Id. at 508.
58. Adler, 342 U.S at 511. "[Ihe guilt of the teacher should turn on overt acts. So long
as she is a law-abiding citizen, so long as her performance within the public school system
meets professional standards, her private life, her political philosophy, her social creed
should not be the cause of reprisals against her." Id.
59. Keyshian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1967).
60. Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 604.
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stituted part of his contract.6' The Court found the change in the
procedure by which the laws became applicable to the employees
did not alter the substance of the restrictions, but that the sec-
tions of the Education Law and the Civil Service Law contained
ill-defined terms and penalties that contributed to the vagueness
and unconstitutionality of the restrictions.62 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, stated: "The very intricacy of the plan
and the uncertainty as to the scope of its proscriptions make it a
highly efficient in terrorem mechanism."63 While recognizing that
the state had a legitimate interest in protecting the school system
from subversion, Justice Brennan explained that the law required
the means to achieve that end must be narrowly tailored to protect
fundamental personal liberties.6" The major premise behind the
decision in Adler - "public employment, including academic em-
ployment, may be conditioned upon the surrender of constitutional
rights which could not be abridged by direct government action" -
was found no longer applicable.65
It was not until Pickering v. Board of Education of Township
High School District that the Court squarely addressed an em-
ployee's rights related to his speech on issues directly pertaining
to or about his employer.66 Pickering raised the question: Could a
public employee, consistent with his First Amendment right to
freedom of speech, be dismissed for publishing information critical
of his employer?" The Court answered this question in the nega-
tive.68
Marvin Pickering, a teacher in Township High School District
205, Illinois, sent a letter to a local newspaper criticizing how the
school district had handled past proposals to raise new revenue for
the schools.69 He was dismissed based on the determination that
the "publication of his letter was 'detrimental to the efficient op-
61. Id. at 596.
62. Id. at 596-98.
63. Id. at 601.
64. Id. at 602.
65. Keyshian, 385 U.S. at 605. The second challenge to the Feinberg Law was an over-
breadth challenge to a provision making Communist Party membership prima facie evi-
dence of disqualification. Id. Justice Brennan cited various opinions that detailed the
Court's longstanding view that placing restrictions on membership, that is 'unaccompanied
by [the] specific intent to further [the] unlawful goals of the organization," or membership
"which is not active membership" violates constitutional limitations. Id. at 608.
66. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
67. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565.
68. Id. at 574.
69. Id. at 564.
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eration and administration of the school district' and, . . . under
relevant Illinois statute, that the interest of the schools required
his termination."70 Pickering challenged his dismissal as a viola-
tion of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.71 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected his First Amendment claim on the
grounds that "his acceptance of a teaching position in the public
schools obliged him to refrain from making statements about the
operation of the schools 'which in the absence of such position he
would have an undoubted right to engage in."72
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and determined that the
high court of Illinois erroneously suggested that teachers in public
employ relinquished their First Amendment rights to "comment
on matters of public interest in connection with the operation of
the public schools in which they work."7" The Court recognized,
however, that the state has a higher interest in regulating its own
employees' speech than it does in regulating the speech of the gen-
eral population.7 4 "The problem in any case is to arrive at a bal-
ance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in com-
menting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees." "
In applying this newly pronounced balancing test to the
Pickering facts, the majority identified some considerations that
must be evaluated.76 First, if there is a question of maintaining
either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among co-
workers, the employer's interest may be afforded more weight.7
Second, if the public employee is in a unique position to have in-
formed and definite opinions on a topic that is of legitimate public
concern, it is essential that the employee be able to speak freely
without the fear of retaliatory dismissal.78 Finally, the impact a
false statement could have on the public perception of the em-
70. Id. at 564-65 (internal citations omitted). The Board held a full hearing on the
matter and therefore no due process violations were raised. Id.
71. Id. at 565.
72. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 567.
73. Id. at 568.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 569.
77. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569. The Court stated that such was not the case in
Pickering and did not suggest an appropriate resolution of such a situation but merely
recognized that "significantly different considerations would be involved in such cases." Id.
at 570 n.3.
78. Id. at 571-72.
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ployer should also be considered when such statements are ut-
tered by an employee presumed to have greater access to knowl-
edge about such employer."9
Justice Marshall, joined by all but Justice White, determined
that Pickering's statements, although erroneous, touched on a
matter of public concern, and while the statements were critical of
his employer, his comments in no way impeded his ability to per-
form his duties or interfered with the operation of the schools gen-
erally." As a result, the Court concluded that the school admini-
stration had no greater interest in limiting Pickering's ability to
contribute in public debate than it did in placing restrictions on
the rights of any member of the general public to do the same."
Four years after the Pickering decision, the Court decided Con-
nick v. Myers,82 in which the Court expressed the importance of the
distinction between speech of public employees on matters of pub-
lic concern versus speech by public employees on matters of pri-
vate concern.83 The Court explained that the government em-
ployer's interest in efficiently fulfilling its responsibilities to the
public outweighs an individual's right to have private speech pro-
tected, and therefore, only employee speech touching on matters of
concern to the public would warrant protection.'
Shelia Myers, a New Orleans, Louisiana, assistant district at-
torney, was terminated for circulating a questionnaire to cowork-
ers requesting their opinions on various office issues, including the
office transfer policy and whether employees felt pressured to par-
ticipate in political campaigns.85 She challenged the dismissal as a
violation of her First Amendment right to free speech." The dis-
trict court ruled in her favor, as did both appellate courts, after
finding that the questionnaire pertained to a matter of public con-
cern, and the State had not demonstrated that it had substantially
interfered with the District Attorney's office operations.8" The
State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the question-
naire was not in fact a matter of public concern and, as such,
79. Id. at 572.
80. Id. at 572-73.
81. Id. at 573.
82. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
83. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
84. Id. at 150-52.
85. Id. at 141.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 141-42.
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should not be subject to the Pickering balancing test.88 Prior to
resolving that issue, the Court explained that if Myers' question-
naire did not in fact pertain to a matter of public concern, then it
was not for the courts to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.89
The Court stated that determining whether an employee's
speech touches on a matter of public concern involves an examina-
tion of the "content, form, and context of a given statement, as re-
vealed by the whole record." ° Based on this analysis, the majority
found the questionnaire to be primarily related to a private em-
ployee grievance.9 Justice White said Myers did not seek to in-
form the public about issues within the District Attorney's office,
such as a failure to discharge its official responsibilities, or intend
to use the survey to bring to light potential wrongdoing or breach
of the public's trust; rather, it was designed to gain ammunition
for another round of controversy with her superiors." Regarding
matters of employee grievances, the Supreme Court announced:
When a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appro-
priate forum in which to review the wisdom of a person-
nel decision taken by a public agency...."
Because the Court found that the question of whether the em-
ployees felt pressured to participate in political campaigns was a
matter of public concern, it embarked on a Pickering balancing
test, clarifying that the "state's burden in justifying a particular
discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's ex-
88. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141-42.
89. Id. at 146. "Vhen employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to
any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment." Id. The Court went on to say that, while
the termination may not be fair and may in fact be unreasonable or mistaken, unless it
violates a statute or regulation that guarantees the employment, the dismissal is not sub-
ject to judicial review. Id.
90. Id. at 147-48.
91. Id. at 148. Myers circulated the questionnaire because she was unhappy with the
District Attorney's decision to transfer her to another department. Id. at 141-42. The
questionnaire focused on the "transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance com-
mittee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work
on political campaigns." Id.
92. Id. at 148.
93. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
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pression."9' Other employees had testified regarding the disrup-
tion Myers caused in her attempt to gather the support of her co-
workers. 5 Because of the recognized importance of the "govern-
ment's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its re-
sponsibilities to the public," the Court "explained that the state
must be given wide discretion and latitude over how it handles its
internal affairs."" The Court determined that the government,
acting as an employer, is entitled to remove employees who nega-
tively impact working relationships and impair workplace effi-
ciency, but it will have to overcome a much more onerous burden if
the employee's speech more substantially relates to matters of
public, rather than private, concern. 7
In its analysis, the Court examined the manner in which the
questionnaire was circulated and the context in which the dispute
arose, determining that Myers' actions had in fact caused a sig-
nificant disruption in the office. 8 As a result, Justice White, over
a four-member dissent, reversed the opinion of the court of ap-
peals, and held that "the limited First Amendment interest" did
not require the State to tolerate Myers activities."
In NTEU the Court revisited a problem similar to that exam-
ined in United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell when it was
asked to determine whether restrictions could be placed on a pub-
lic employee's right to engage in free speech outside of the work-
place on matters unrelated to his official position."°° In NTEU, the
Court addressed whether "a law that broadly prohibits federal
employees from accepting any compensation for making speeches
or writing articles" abridges freedom of speech when "neither the
subject of the speech or article nor the person or group paying for
it has any connection with the employee's official duties."' The
Supreme Court noted the importance of the social and cultural
contributions made by former public employees and stressed that
the class challenging the current prohibition were seeking com-
pensation for expressing themselves as private citizens, not as
government employees.'
94. Id. at 150.
95. Id. at 151.
96. Id. at 150-52.
97. Id. at 151-52.
98. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152-54.
99. Id. at 154.
100. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 457.
101. Id. at 457.
102. Id. at 464-65.
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A report produced by The Commission on Executive, Legisla-
tive, and Judicial Salaries explained that, due to the inadequacy of
the salaries paid to Congress, many members were supplementing
their official compensation by accepting substantial amounts of
honoraria for meeting with interests groups."' The Commission
recommended a significant salary increase as well as a prohibition
on the receipt of honoraria by all three branches of government.
0 4
As a result, even rank-and-file employees were prohibited under
the terms of the honoraria ban from receiving compensation for
any form of speech, including payments for such activities as lec-
turing on the Quaker religion or black history, or publishing arti-
cles on dance performances. 15
The district and circuit courts for the District of Columbia held
that any legislation restricting freedom of speech must "go no far-
ther than necessary to accomplish its objective." ' As a result, the
district court and the court of appeals found the ban to be uncon-
stitutional as it applied to the executive branch of the government
because it failed to establish any sort of relationship between the
goal of the legislation and its application to the class challenging
the ban.'7
The Supreme Court noted, because the speech in question falls
within the protected category of speech by a public employee on a
matter of public concern, the government must apply the princi-
pals set forth in Pickering and Connick.'0 ° The Court found that
while the restriction was designed primarily to discourage high
level government officials generally - and Congress members
primarily - from engaging in public speaking for compensation, it
also had the effect of prohibiting lower paid rank-and-file employ-
ees not subject to the salary increase from being compensated,
which would "inevitably diminish their expressive output."' 9 This
would also "impose a significant burden on the public's right to
read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written
and said.""'
103. Id. at 458.
104. Id.
105. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 461.
106. Id. at 462-63.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 466. The Court further stated that the government may take disciplinary
action with regard to private speech that involves a complaint about the employee's own
duties without facing any special burden of justification for its actions. Id.
109. Id. at 469-70.
110. Id. at 470.
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Justice Stevens distinguished the holding in United Public
Workers of America v. Mitchell from the case sub judice, asserting
that the purpose behind restricting public employees participating
in political activities was, inter alia, a protectionist measure de-
signed to "further serve the goal that employment and advance-
ment in the Government service not depend on political perform-
ance."11 The Court acknowledged the government's interest in
ensuring its officials do not misuse their powers; however, Justice
Stevens pointed out that the government failed to cite any in-
stances of misconduct that would establish how applying the ban
to the rank-and-file employees furthers that interest."
2
The Court went on to explain that, by singling out expressive
activity, the government has made its burden even harder to over-
come when attempting to justify its ban, and the speculative bene-
fits it cites are insufficient to justify the burden placed on respon-
dents' freedom of expression."' As a result, the Court held that
the ban violated the First Amendment.
4
In Berger v. Battaglia,"' the Fourth Circuit examined whether
the effect of a government employee's speech on the public's per-
ception of the government office could justify termination of the
employee. Berger was a Baltimore police officer who worked as a
musician in the evenings. 6 His act included an impersonation of
Al Jolson, which he performed in blackface."' The police depart-
ment feared Berger's activities would thwart the department's
efforts to improve relations between the police and the black
community and ordered him to cease performing in blackface in
violation of departmental policies that prohibited any activity that
might reflect negatively on himself or the department. 18
Berger brought a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
department, claiming the department was punishing him for past
111. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 470-71. See United Public Workers of Am., 330 U.S. at 75 (hold-
ing that Congress can constitutionally prohibit government employees from soliciting,
giving to, or receiving from other governmental employees money or other property of value
for political purposes).
112. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 471-72.
113. Id. at477.
114. Id. The Court limited its remedy to those before the Court, finding the statute un-
constitutional as it applies to rank-and-file Executive Branch employees of the United
States government only currently before the Court. Id.
115. 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985).
116. Berger, 779 F.2d at 993.
117. Id. Advertisements regarding upcoming performances proved offensive to many
black citizens, including some members of the NAACP. Id. at 994.
118. Id. at 995-96.
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performances by prohibiting him from performing and refusing to
allow him to perform for compensation."9  The department con-
ceded at trial that there was no disruption of internal harmony.
12
1
The district court and court of appeals agreed that the Pickering
balancing test was designed for application to clashes between an
employee's right to criticize his employer and the employer's right
to prevent the disruptive effect such criticisms could have on the
place of employment. 12 ' The Berger facts presented a different
problem: the speech was not a criticism of the employer, and the
government's interest was not in preventing internal disruptions
but rather in preventing external disruptions from members of the
public.' 22 The court of appeals nevertheless found Pickering to be
controlling and weighed in favor of Berger.121 Circuit Judge Phil-
lips said that all public employee speech, except that which is real-
istically viewed as private - most typically personnel grievances
- is within the general protection of the First Amendment. 124 The
threshold question is whether the speech is likely to be of interest
to the public, rather than merely a private matter between em-
ployer and employee.'
12
Berger's entertainment activities were found to touch on a mat-
ter of public concern and, applying Pickering, the circuit court
held: "[I]t is at least arguable from Pickering, its antecedents, and
its progeny, that the only public employer interest that can out-
weigh a public employee's recognized speech rights is the interest
in avoiding direct disruption, by the speech itself, of the public
employer's internal operations and employment relations."26
In Flanagan v. Munger,2' the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit held that, even absent a finding that speech
touches on a matter of public concern, the Pickering test can still
be applied to compare an employee's interest in free speech and
his employer's interest in the efficient functioning of govern-
ment.128 In Flanagan, the Colorado Springs police department ar-
gued that the public's faith in the police department would be
119. Id. at 996. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights (2000).
120. Berger, 779 F.2d at 996.
121. Id. at 996-97.
122. Id. at 997.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 998.
125. Berger, 779 F.2d at 999.
126. Id. at 1000.
127. 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989).
128. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1564.
200 Vol. 44
City of San Diego v. Roe
eroded if it found out that police officers, who owned a video store,
were renting sexually explicit videos to customers.9 The three-
judge panel held that "[t]he department cannot justify disciplinary
action against plaintiffs simply because some members of the pub-
lic find plaintiffs' speech offensive and for that reason may not
cooperate with law enforcement officers in the future."3 ' The cir-
cuit court reiterated that, absent a showing that the speech has in
fact caused injury to the internal harmony and efficiency of the
governmental workplace, a restriction on such employee speech
will be unconstitutional.
31
While there is no Supreme Court case to the four corners with
Roe, there is persuasive authority at the appellate level to support
the contention that the Court reached an erroneous decision when
it found in favor of the City of San Diego Police Department. The
Supreme Court quickly dismissed the possibility that Roe's speech
touched on a matter of concern to the public and therefore never
reached the Pickering balancing test.132 Yet there is a strong ar-
gument that Roe's speech does pertain to a matter of public con-
cern. 133 Further, even the determination that the speech is not on
a matter of public concern does not preclude the Court from apply-
ing the balancing test to determine if in fact the San Diego Police
Department's interest in curtailing his expressive activities was
weightier than Roe's fundamental right to engage in free speech.
The Supreme Court in Roe said the court of appeals' reliance on
NTEU was misplaced because Roe's speech was injurious to his
employer.' However, no evidence of such injury exists in the re-
cord. In fact, the only people aware of both Roe's affiliation with
the SDPD and his eBay activities were certain officers at the po-
lice department.'35 Since no person outside of the department was
aware of Roe's activities, it is unreasonable to suggest that he cast
any sort of negative light on the department's reputation or abili-
ties to perform its governmental functions.
129. Id. at 1566.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1566-67.
132. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 526.
133. See Berger, 779 F.2d at 992, 999-1000 (finding that entertainment speech of police
officer that is neutral as to any political or social view was upon a matter of public concern
and entitled to Pickering balancing).
134. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 524.
135. Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004).
Fall 2005 201
Duquesne Law Review
The court of appeals noted the City's concession that Roe's
speech was "unrelated to the job."'36 The per curiam opinion of the
Supreme Court, however, stated that the City was merely under-
scoring that Roe was not commenting on the workings of the police
department, implying that because his speech was not designed to
educate or inform the public, he was not engaging in speech that
is a matter of public concern.'37 Based on that premise, the Court
refused to grant NTEU protection to Roe's speech.' The Court
gave the phrase "matter of public concern" a very narrow defini-
tion, stating that only speech that is newsworthy or of interest to
the public at the time of publication qualifies.'39 It erroneously
opined that Roe's expression fails to "qualify as a matter of public
concern under any view of the public concern test." °
Not every unique situation involving the speech of a governmen-
tal employee and his resulting termination has been brought be-
fore the Court, and therefore it is impossible to create categories of
speech that do touch on a matter of public concern and categories
that do not. However, there is sufficient jurisprudence to clarify
what has been consistently held to be a matter purely of private
concern to the employee and employer and therefore not deserving
of constitutional protection. The Court has almost exclusively
found that personnel grievances are personal employment matters
and the only distinct category of speech afforded no constitutional
protection. 4' However, in determining that Roe's speech did not
touch on a matter of public concern, the Court did not cite to prior
cases in which speech unrelated to employment and not touching
on an employment issue fit the time-honored test that limits pri-
vate speech to personnel grievances. The Court not only ignored
cases in which expression unrelated to employment has been held
to survive the public concern test.42 But it also ignored something
more patently obvious: clearly, there are members of the public
who are interested in what Roe has to say. There is an entire sec-
tion on eBay dedicated to the sale of sexually explicit adult mate-
rials. Nobody is suggesting that Roe's speech qualifies as obscen-
136. Roe, 356 F.3d at 1112 n.4.
137. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 524.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 526.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); Connick, 461 U.S. at 153-54.
142. See, e.g., Berger, 779 F.2d 992; Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231 (4th Cir.
1999).
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ity; therefore, it impliedly has some social, political, literary, or
scientific value as adjudged by contemporary community stan-
dards."3 It may not be the kind of speech that the Court wishes to
promote, but it does not fit into a category of unprotected speech.'"
The Court cannot restrict Roe's right to engage in protected speech
while staying true to the aims of the First Amendment.'" "One of
the fundamental rights secured by the First Amendment is that of
free, uncensored, artistic expression, even on matters trivial, vul-
gar, or profane. "" '
The Supreme Court wished to treat Roe's speech as purely pri-
vate in nature, and as a result, to permit the SDPD to terminate
him due to the supposedly injurious effect the speech had on the
department's reputation. It is generally accepted that the gov-
ernment is to be given wide latitude when it seeks to discipline an
employee for engaging in speech that is contrary to the mission of
the employer. " 7 The government, like any other employer, must
be afforded the power to terminate individuals hired to promote
their mission when those individuals act contrary to the mission.
But, as the court of appeals correctly stated, Roe's speech was
completely unrelated to his employment."8 He did not identify
himself as a San Diego police officer; he provided a northern Cali-
fornia address and a pseudonym. "9 Roe took steps to disassociate
himself from his specific employer. His use of the police uniform
was not designed to link him to the San Diego Police Department;
it was merely a prop for his homemade videos. The Court wished
to suggest that the absence of comment on his government work-
place is a valid reason for taking this speech out of the "public
concern" category and relegating it to mere private speech that is
143. The Supreme Court provided a test for determining whether speech is obscene in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The three-part test requires an examination of:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards," would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to a prurient inter-
est, (b), whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
144. Historically, "the list of unprotected speech included incitements to violence, libel,
obscenity, fighting words, and commercial advertising." FARBER, JAMES M., THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, 13 (Foundation Press 2003) (1998).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
146. Berger, 779 F. 2d at 1000.
147. See Waters, 511 U.S. 661.
148. Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d at 1120.
149. Id. at 1110.
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afforded no protection. Roe's attempts at extinguishing his con-
nection to his actual employer resulted in the Court affording him
less protection than any other member of the general public. But,
when not serving in his official capacity of a police officer, engag-
ing in speech unrelated to his governmental employer, Roe is a
private citizen. lie is a member of the general public engaging in
protected speech who should be afforded the same protections as
any citizen under the First Amendment.
Public employee speech that is unrelated to governmental em-
ployment is still protected speech. Such speech has been afforded
constitutional protection by our courts, even where there is the
potential that it will negatively impact the reputation of the em-
ployer.15 In Berger, entertainment expression was found to touch
on a matter of public concern, and the possibility of it offending
members of the community was insufficient to sustain the state's
burden in proving its interest outweighed the speakers' interest. 1'
Roe's expressive activity, like Berger's, did not reflect the typical
situation to which Pickering balancing is normally applied. His
eBay activities occurred while he was off-duty and did not involve
a criticism or comment on the SDPD. The department's interest
was in preventing the public from adopting a negative opinion of
the police, not in promoting the efficiency of internal operations.'
Yet the court still refused to apply the public concern test.
In Flanagan, a case where the speech was not found to touch on
a matter of public concern, the court of appeals opined that a bal-
ancing test should still be applied to ensure that a state employer
was not infringing on its employees' fundamental rights to engage
in free speech.' Whether the speech touches on a matter of public
concern or not, courts have found ample constitutional support to
weigh in favor of the speaker, rather than the employer, when the
employer is unable to show that the speech has had an adverse
effect on the efficiency and harmony of the governmental employer
work environment.
5 4
In NTEU, the Court held that the state's failure to identify any
injury caused by the speech it was attempting to restrict was a
detrimental flaw in its claim that it had a legitimate interest in
150. See, e.g., Berger, 779 F.2d 992; Flanagan, 890 F.2d 1557.
151. Berger, 779 F.2d at 1002.
152. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 524.
153. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1564-65.
154. See, e.g., NTEU, 513 U.S. 454; Flanagan, 890 F.2d 1557; Berger, 779 F.2d 992.
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restricting that speech."' Because the State rested on the possibil-
ity of disruption or impropriety within the governmental agency,
rather than evidencing concrete examples of how the speech had
disrupted harmony or efficient functioning of the agency, the
Court found the restriction unconstitutional.5 5 A large number of
employees who posed virtually no risk to the harmony or function-
ing of the agency would be impacted by the restriction - a result
that was counter to their right to free speech." 7
Even if the Court was correct in categorizing Roe's speech as a
matter of purely private interest, Roe's speech still has not been
proven to harm the proper functioning of the SDPD. In Berger,
the United States Court of Appeals stated that "short of direct in-
citements to violence by the very content of the public employee's
speech ... threatened disruption by others reacting to public em-
ployee speech simply may not be allowed to serve as justification
for public employer disciplinary action directed at that speech."158
Berger is on point with Roe and holds true to the principals fol-
lowed in NTEU while applying the Pickering/Connick tests on
which the Supreme Court relies in Roe. 59
The per curiam opinion in Roe quickly dismissed the possibility
that Roe's speech touched on a matter of public concern by limit-
ing the definition of such speech to subjects that are a matter of
legitimate news interest, or one about which a public employee
has special knowledge because of his position. This narrow defini-
tion, which equates the standard to that applied when determin-
160ing whether a common law cause of action for invasion of privacy
exists ignores two decades of jurisprudence that expanded the
definition of public employees' speech on matters of public concern
to include virtually any speech that is not related only to person-
nel issues.' Had the Supreme Court done a more extensive
155. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 471-75.
156. Id. at 476-77.
157. Id. at 477.
158. Berger, 779 F.2d at 1001.
159. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454; Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Pickering, 391 U.S. 563; Berger, 779
F.2d at 1001.
160. See Cox Broadcasting Corp v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469, 475 (1975). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 867 (1979).
161. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 525. See e.g. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454 (rank and file executive branch
employees speech pertaining to views on literature, art, etc. protected); Givhan v. Western
Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (speech communicated privately to
employer is still a matter of public concern deserving protection); Edwards v. City of Golds-
boro, 178 F.3d 231 (3d. Cir. 1999) (finding seargant's speech on "proper use and manner of
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analysis of jurisprudence in this area, it would have found justifi-
cation for determining that Roe's speech did in fact qualify as
speech on a matter of public concern, thus warranting Picker-
ing/Connick balancing. 162 By refusing to find that Roe's speech
touched on a matter of public concern, the Court clearly made a
content-based distinction about what the Court believed to be im-
portant to the public. Rather than limiting governmental employ-
ers to restricting speech activities when they are related to per-
sonnel grievances, the Court gave those employers license to exer-
cise prior restraint'63 of the employee's fundamental right to free
expression by determining that certain protected speech should
lose its constitutional protection because the speaker is an em-
ployee of the state and the state disapproves of the employee's
personal opinions on topics unrelated to employment. This is con-
trary to the aim of the Pickering test, which is to "balance the
plaintiff's interest in engaging in free speech, not the value of the
speech itself," and is clearly a results-driven approach to the is-
164sue.
After dismissing Roe's expression as speech that does not touch
on a matter of public concern, the Court determined the balancing
test was not warranted.6 6 Roe's termination for engaging in con-
stitutionally protected free expression was sanctioned.
If the Court continues to hand down and be bound by decisions
such as City of San Diego v. Roe, there is the danger of far-
reaching chilling of speech.'66 All governmental employees will be
forced to evaluate whether their activities outside of their em-
ployment could potentially reflect negatively on their employer.
Employees will have to choose between protected speech and gov-
ernment employment. Forcing our governmental employees to
carrying a concealed handgun in North Carolina" to be a matter of public concern); Berger,
779 F.2d 992 (police officer's performance as musician/singer protected).
162. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
163. Prior restraints of speech or press are presumed unconstitutional, but may be valid
if they affect only communications not protected by the First Amendment, or if they re-
strain activities which pose a serious, imminent threat to a protected public interest, pro-
vided they are precisely drawn and use procedures which avoid the dangers of censorship.
16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 543 (1985).
164. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1565.
165. Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 526.
166. See id. at 521.
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choose between engaging in protected speech and government em-
ployment encourages a subtle but fatal erosion of the First
Amendment rights of all citizens.
Natalie Rieland

